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DAN MEAGHER* 
Professor George Winterton lost his long, difficult and brave battle with 
cancer in November 2008. He was a true giant of Australian constitutional 
law scholarship and the academy more generally. This volume, originally 
conceived as a festschrift to celebrate his retirement as Professor of 
Constitutional Law at the University of Sydney, now stands as a fitting tribute 
to Professor Winterton’s brilliant academic legacy and the deep and loving 
regard in which he was held by so many students, colleagues and friends.  
This much is made clear in the heartfelt and illuminating contributions at the 
beginning of the book. Sir Gerard Brennan writes a wonderful Foreword that 
is both a personal tribute to Professor Winterton and pithy summation of the 
theme and substance of the book. There are also three personal reflections 
from Rosalind Dixon1 (a former student of Professor Winterton), Julian 
Lesser2 (a republican adversary) and Lawrence Maher.3
                                                 
* School of Law, Deakin University. 
 They highlight 
1 ‘George Winterton: A Friend to Students and Foreign Law’, xxi. 
2 ‘My Mate in Empire: George Winterton and the Republic Debate’, xxix. 
3 ‘George Winterton: A Singular, Gifted Scholar’, xxxviii. 
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Professor Winterton’s mastery of, and passion for, constitutional law, and 
how these were brought to bear in his teaching, scholarship and engagement 
with the great political and constitutional issues of the day. Fittingly, the 
introductory section of the book is closed with an obituary written by Robert 
French, the current Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia. Apart from 
detailing the many and impressive milestones in Professor Winterton’s 
personal and professional career, it also has a special — indeed personal — 
resonance. Both men were law graduates from the University of Western 
Australia and had worked together in establishing the Aboriginal Legal 
Service for Western Australia in the 1970s. The Chief Justice recalls their 
final conversation when, amongst other things, they spoke about the reasoning 
of his Honour in the Tampa case4 when a member of the Federal Court and 
specifically their disagreement as to whether the Crown’s prerogative powers 
limit the executive power of the Commonwealth.5 That issue, indeed the 
scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth more generally, was one 
of Professor Winterton’s abiding scholarly interests. In this regard his 
landmark text — Parliament, The Executive and The Governor-General —
remains the most impressive, coherent and accessible treatment of this 
notoriously complex area of Australian constitutional law.6
The main body of the volume consists of 13 chapters and is organised around 
the theme that constitutional advancement has occurred in Australia 
notwithstanding how few formal amendments have been made to the text of 
the Australian Constitution since federation. Indeed the difficulty of effecting 
constitutional change through the referendum process is underlined by the fact 
that only 8 of 44 proposals have been agreed to by the Australian people. As 
reflected in the title of the book, it was this paucity of formal constitutional 
change that led Professor Geoffrey Sawer famously to observe that Australia 
was ‘constitutionally speaking … the frozen continent.’
    
7
The States’ financial and constitutional positions are weaker, both the 
product of the Constitution’s provisions (including, importantly, s 109) and 
 It is also worth 
noting at the outset that the consequence of the constitutional advancement 
described throughout the volume has been a dramatic centralising of 
legislative, executive and even judicial power with the Commonwealth. Most, 
though not all, of the contributors accept the inevitability, if not desirability, 
of this development. Professor Winterton was of a similar mind:  
                                                 
4 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 183 ALR 1. 
5 ‘A Voice Not Stilled: An Obituary in Recollection of George Winterton’, xlix, l.   
6 George Winterton, Parliament, The Executive and The Governor-General (Melbourne 
University Press, 1983).  
7 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne University Press, 1967) 
208. 
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High Court interpretation. The latter has undoubtedly favoured the 
Commonwealth since the Engineers case, but is a product of the 
constitutional text as well as the political and economic history of Australia 
— war, depression, economic development, the growth of a national 
economy, and ‘globalization’ — not a relentless High Court drive for 
centralization, as some have suggested.8
In chapter 1, John Williams gives a fascinating insight into the drafting 
process for section 128 of the Constitution and considers whether the framers 
realised that the amendment process they settled on would prove so difficult 
to satisfy. (They probably did not.)
 
9
The vehicle has been judicial interpretation of the Constitution, specifically 
the constitutional judgments of the High Court. To some extent, this is 
unremarkable. The application of a fundamental law of government – 
expressed in broad and open-ended language - to changing social, economic 
and political circumstances will inevitably yield new constitutional insights 
and meaning. However, as Sir Anthony Mason notes, ‘there are very 
important limits to the capacity of judges to achieve legitimate constitutional 
change by means of interpretation, even if these limits are difficult to 
articulate.’
 Striking an appropriate balance between 
stability and change and the principles of federalism and democracy was no 
easy matter. But, as the rest of the volume so amply demonstrates, 
constitutional advancement — indeed fundamental constitutional change — 
has nevertheless taken place.  
10
In any event, in chapter 2, in a characteristically erudite and tightly reasoned 
contribution, Geoffrey Lindell outlines how and why the intergovernmental 
immunity doctrine has advanced the defining characteristic of the 
Constitution: the federal principle. It’s a masterly and wide-ranging 
contribution that argues for a conception of the doctrine that recognises that 
‘[n]either the States nor the Commonwealth should be seen as subordinate to, 
or subjects of, each other having regard to the federal nature of government in 
Australia.’
 
11
                                                 
8 George Winterton, ‘The High Court and Federalism: A Centenary Evaluation’ in Peter Cane 
(ed), Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (Lexisnexis Butterworths, 2004) 219–
220. 
 The chapter also contains a searching critique of the reasoning in 
Austin v Commonwealth (and so Clarke v Commissioner of Taxation) where 
9 Ch 1, 17–20. 
10 Ch 13, 283. 
11 Ch 2, 50. 
110 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 15 NO 1 
the High Court collapsed the well-established two-limbed intergovernmental 
immunity test into a single discrimination inquiry.12
H P Lee then turns to consider the democratic and constitutional responses to 
imminent national security threats.
 It merits close attention. 
13 He does so, mainly, by assessing the 
High Court’s commitment to the rule of law as evidenced in its review of 
Australian terrorism legislation, most notably its preventative detention and 
control order regimes.14 Lee is far from impressed with the Court’s 
commitment to the rule of law in the post 9/11 context. In his view, the 
general historical trend of the courts deferring to the judgment and wisdom of 
the elected arms of government must not be at the expense of fundamental 
constitutional principle. Lee posits that the gold standard in this regard is the 
Communist Party Case.15 So, whilst it may be perfectly proper to countenance 
an expanded scope for the defence power during the so-called war on terror – 
indeed this is constitutional advancement through judicial interpretation par 
excellence – the Communist Party Case is for Lee ‘a constant clarion call to 
the judiciary to maintain constitutional fidelity, especially in troubled times.’16
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 we encounter fascinating and comprehensive overviews 
of the constitutional jurisprudence pertaining to the environment,
 
17 industrial 
relations18 and native title.19
As Johnston points out, ‘whether the Constitution has been or will continue to 
be adequate in furnishing government with the means to address constantly 
emerging environmental problems’
 In these contributions — written by Peter 
Johnston, George Williams and David Hume, and Chief Justice French 
respectively — the propensity for and extent of constitutional advancement 
(or at least change) through judicial interpretation in Australia becomes 
startlingly clear.  
20
                                                 
12 Ibid 34–40. 
 is a contemporary issue of national 
significance. That is especially so in the absence of an express legislative 
power in the Constitution over the environment. However, the financial near-
hegemony of the Commonwealth and an expansive judicial construction of 
the corporations and external affairs powers in particular has led Johnston to 
conclude, correctly in my view, that formal constitutional amendment is 
13 Ch 3. 
14 Ibid 66–77. 
15 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
16 Ch 3, 78. 
17 Ch 4. 
18 Ch 5. 
19 Ch 6. 
20 Ch 4, 79. 
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neither wise nor necessary to meet these considerable and ongoing 
environmental challenges.  
The extent to which judicial interpretation has centralised legislative power 
over industrial relations is generally well known amongst constitutional 
lawyers, especially in light of the recent and high profile Work Choices 
litigation in the High Court.21 Nevertheless, the chapter by George Williams 
and David Hume underlines the fact that this ‘constitutional advancement’ is 
one of our more astonishing constitutional narratives. The framers did in fact 
provide the Commonwealth with an express power over industrial disputes, 
but only those with an interstate dimension. That federal limitation was 
gradually eroded by the High Court relaxing the notion of what constituted a 
‘dispute’ and permitting their ‘manufacture’ across State borders. However, it 
was arguably the Engineers22 decision in 1920 that is the key to understanding 
the inexorable march of the Commonwealth in the field of industrial relations 
and many other fields besides. In any event, the expansive construction of the 
external affairs and corporations powers noted earlier also provided the 
Commonwealth with the constitutional means effectively to take over 
industrial relations free from any federal limitation. This is something the 
Commonwealth failed to do — three times! — through the formal amendment 
process. Williams and Hume rightly conclude on a cautionary (maybe rueful) 
note: ‘The degree of change suggests that the future development of 
Commonwealth power in this area should be carefully scrutinised lest it 
exceed its natural and proper limitations as expressed in the text of the 
Constitution.’23
The recognition of native title was, strictly speaking, a common law 
development. But in dispensing with the shibboleth that Australia was ‘terra 
nullius’ at the time of European settlement, the High Court’s decision in 
Mabo v Queensland (No 2)
 
24
The rights jurisprudence of the High Court is considered next. In chapter 7 
Keven Booker and Arthur Glass have written a nuanced and solid defence of 
 corrected the historical record and in a very real 
sense re-laid our constitutional foundations. In his panoramic overview, Chief 
Justice French in chapter 6 traces the development of the law of native title 
and explains why its recognition and protection will always provide 
significant challenges for the courts and, more importantly, the first 
Australians who seek to reclaim the land that is their cultural and spiritual 
essence.  
                                                 
21 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1. 
22 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
23 Ch 5, 125. 
24 (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
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the High Court’s judicial interpretation of the express rights provisions in the 
Constitution. And even though ‘[t]heir text, context and special history have 
produced a body of law of a largely technical and somewhat disparate 
character’,25 it’s been far from a ‘frozen continent’ from an express rights 
perspective in the view of these authors. Human rights can no doubt be better 
protected in Australia. However, the authors argue (convincingly, in my view, 
with the possible exception of recent section 117 case law26) that this is not 
the result of poor methodology or decision-making by the High Court in its 
express rights jurisprudence.27
Nicholas Aroney, on the other hand, is highly critical of the Court’s derivation 
of an implied constitutional freedom of political communication. In chapter 8 
Aroney picks up and expands upon a theme familiar in his scholarship: the 
claim that the implied freedom did not logically or of necessity emerge from 
the text and structure of the constitutional text — as the separation of powers 
did — but from extra-constitutional notions.
  
28 He argues that in deriving a 
constitutional implication from extra-constitutional notions, the Court 
subverts democracy, the rule of law and the Constitution itself.29
Chapter 9 is especially poignant. Peter Gerangelos writes on ‘Parliament, the 
Executive, the Governor-General and the Republic: The George Winterton 
Thesis’. This is a contribution that was originally planned in collaboration 
with Professor Winterton. At the heart of the chapter is Winterton’s core 
argument regarding the scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth 
and how it ought to be measured. 
 
[A]part from ‘executing’ the Constitution and the laws of the 
Commonwealth, the government is limited to those powers falling within 
the Crown’s prerogative powers.30
So far this view has not found favour with the High Court, which considers 
that the terms of section 61 itself — not the content of the prerogative in 
Britain — form the relevant constitutional touchstone in this regard. That 
proposition is of course question-begging, but what has become clear from the 
case law is that section 61 (at the least) provides the Commonwealth with the 
‘capacity to engage in enterprises and activities peculiarly adapted to the 
 
                                                 
25 Ch 7, 172. 
26 See Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission (2006) 226 CLR 362. 
27 Ch 7, 172.  
28 See Nicholas Aroney, Freedom of Speech in the Constitution (Centre for Independent 
Studies, 1998).  
29 Ch 8, 184 and 187. 
30 Ch 9, 193–4. 
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government of a nation and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the 
benefit of the nation.’31 Professor Winterton was rightly concerned about the 
scope of this implied nationhood power if its existence means that the 
Commonwealth government ‘can undertake (without legislative authority 
other than appropriation of the necessary funds) any activity which is 
considered appropriate for a national government.’32 However, it might be 
argued that this more open-ended conception of Commonwealth executive 
power is appropriate, if not necessary, to meet the exigencies of modern 
government and is precisely the kind of beneficial constitutional advancement 
by judicial interpretation that is otherwise celebrated in the volume. But ‘the 
Constitution was not inscribed upon a tabula rasa’33 and Winterton well 
understood that ‘Ch II …, including s 61, cannot be interpreted sensibly 
without reference to the Crown’s prerogative powers’.34
It is desirable that executive action be subject to legislation, especially 
under a system of responsible government: this promotes accountability to 
Parliament, giving Parliament authority to examine executive action; it 
strengthens the rule of law by subjecting executive action to judicial 
review…; and it enhances democratic government since legislation requires 
greater democratic input than executive action.
 Moreover, there is a 
significant upside for constitutional government in Australia if the depth of 
Commonwealth executive power is measured against the prerogative. As a 
creature of the common law, it is subject to legislation and therefore 
parliamentary control:  
35
The balance of the chapter outlines a series of invaluable reform proposals 
pertaining to Chapter II of the Constitution - ‘The Executive Government’ - 
that are considered in the context of Australia becoming a republic. These 
proposals are sensible, minimalist and would serve to strengthen the 
fundamentals of constitutional government in Australia, most notably 
responsible and representative government and the rule of law. As Peter 
Gerangelos rightly concludes: 
 
Whatever the future may hold for an Australian republic, the Winterton 
thesis on the executive power of the Commonwealth, and the Winterton 
draft itself, will remain at the very centre of all future deliberation, if not the 
                                                 
31 Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397 (Mason J). 
32 Ch 9, 193. 
33 Ibid 197. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 198. 
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cornerstone of fundamental constitutional change in ‘the frozen 
continent’.36
In chapter 10, Fiona Wheeler makes a strong, indeed compelling, argument 
that the High Court’s jurisprudence on the constitutional separation of judicial 
power has largely met the many regulatory challenges of modern government 
whilst remaining doctrinally sound. It has done so mainly through its 
progressive and flexible conception of ‘federal judicial power’, an approach 
that has always characterised its Ch III jurisprudence, according to Wheeler.
 
37 
Interestingly, and contrary to HP Lee’s earlier chapter, Wheeler uses the 
controversial High Court decision in Thomas v Mowbray38 (the control order 
case) to illustrate and underline her thesis and to warn that ‘in the absence of a 
Bill of Rights, attempts to project ‘rights’ arguments onto Ch III that lack a 
clear foundation in the relevant constitutional language and context should be 
resisted.’39
Chapters 11 and 12 engage more directly with the theories and methods of 
constitutional interpretation that drive constitutional advancement in a frozen 
continent. In the former, Jeffrey Goldsworthy lays down a strong interpretive 
challenge to the High Court: ‘The time for theoretical timidity is long gone. If 
it is not yet possible to articulate the principles, broader doctrines and over-
arching theories that should guide interpretation, it never will be.’
  
40 To this 
end, Goldsworthy refines and forcefully restates his argument that ‘the theory 
[of] ‘moderate originalism’ provides a tolerably accurate account of the 
Court’s traditional approach to constitutional interpretation.’41 Although a 
theory of some complexity, its essence is that it ‘denies that the pre-existing 
meaning of the Constitution can be deliberately changed without a formal 
constitutional amendment, [but] the meaning or operation of constitutional 
law can legitimately evolve over time.’42 There are four ways this 
constitutional advancement can occur whilst remaining faithful to the original 
intended meaning of the Constitution — the touchstone of the theory’s 
legitimacy.43
                                                 
36 Ibid 221. 
 The claim of moderate originalism is, then, that it provides for 
constitutional advancement by a legitimate process of interpretation (not 
37 Ch 10, 229–30. 
38 (2007) 233 CLR 307. 
39 Ibid 243. 
40 Ch 11, 247. 
41 Ibid 247-8; see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’ 
(1997) 25 Federal Law Review 1.  
42 Ibid 250. 
43 See ibid 250–3. 
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judicial amendment) and in doing so it accords with the fundamental 
principles of federalism, democracy and the rule of law.44
Leslie Zines, on the other hand, picks apart the constitutional jurisprudence of 
the Gleeson High Court and the interpretive methodology of the Chief Justice 
in particular. In a fascinating chapter, Zines subjects to critical scrutiny the 
regular, often extra-curial, pronouncements made by Gleeson CJ that a ‘strict 
and complete legalism’ is the only legitimate way to determine constitutional 
disputes.
 
45 This approach was evident early in his tenure as Chief Justice 
when he joined the majority in Re Wakim,46 the High Court decision that 
invalidated key aspects of the popular and functional judicial cross-vesting 
scheme.47 Zines, however, then goes on to demonstrate convincingly that 
‘when his judgments as a whole are examined, it is clear that Murray Gleeson 
was one of the least legalistic of the judges of his court.’48
He was not a strong adherent of the principle of original meaning, he saw 
fundamental rights and freedoms as a strong factor in statutory 
interpretation and, in many cases, had open regard to social consequences 
and policy considerations in his interpretation of the Constitution.
 
49
So, whilst Justice Gummow may have been ‘the most influential judge in 
constitutional cases’
 
50 on the Gleeson Court, ‘it can be said that Gleeson CJ’s 
judgments (whether we agree with them or not) often stand as models of clear 
concise reasoning and open regard for social considerations and human 
rights.’51 According to Zines, ‘[t]hese are not qualities that have … 
characterised the Gleeson Court as a whole.’52
The final chapter, written by Sir Anthony Mason, contains a number of 
entertaining and illuminating reflections on the various forms of constitutional 
advancement described throughout the volume. He rightly points out that no 
contributor denies the legitimacy of constitutional advancement through 
judicial interpretation. But, as the chapters by Aroney and Goldsworthy (and 
to a lesser extent Williams and Hume) suggest, the real interpretive question 
 
                                                 
44 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’ (2000) 24 
Melbourne University Law Review 677. 
45 Ch 12, 269. 
46 (1999) 198 CLR 511. 
47 Ibid 270. 
48 Ibid 271. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 282. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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is whether the High Court has on occasion crossed that, admittedly fuzzy, line 
that divides legitimate constitutional interpretation from illegitimate judicial 
amendment. In this regard, the chapter takes issue with both Aroney’s 
illegitimacy claim53 and the substance of (if not the need for) Goldsworthy’s 
all-embracing interpretive theory of ‘moderate originalism’.54 This may come 
as no surprise. Sir Anthony wrote the leading judgment in one of the seminal 
implied rights cases55 and, as Chief Justice of the High Court, presided over 
an era of, arguably, unprecedented constitutional advancement through 
judicial interpretation.56 However his criticisms bear close scrutiny and those 
regarding the origins of the implied freedom of political communication are 
particularly compelling in my view. The chapter concludes with some 
pertinent observations regarding the problematic nature of the Kable principle 
and the likelihood of more High Courts cases where the impugned legislation 
seeks to modify the manner in which the courts exercise judicial power.  Sir 
Anthony warns that ‘at some point, stripping the courts of their usual 
characteristics associated with due process and procedural fairness results in 
bodies in whom jurisdiction is invested ceasing to satisfy the requirements of 
Ch III, in particular s 71.’57
The scholarship in Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen Continent is 
wide-ranging, challenging and of the highest quality. H P Lee and Peter 
Gerangelos are to be congratulated for editing a volume that manages to do 
justice to the memory of a brilliant scholar and their close friend. 
 
George Winterton has passed from our midst. But his voice has not been 
stilled. His intellectual legacy means that it will be heard in our lecture halls 
and constitutional debates and will make its contribution to the development 
of our nationhood for many years to come.58
                                                 
53 Ch 13, 292–3. 
 
54 Ibid 284–5, 286–92. 
55 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.  
56 See Jason Pierce, Inside the Mason Court Revolution: The High Court of Australia 
Transformed (Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 
57 Ch 13, 298. 
58 Robert French, ‘A Voice Not Stilled: An Obituary in Recollection of George Winterton’ lii. 
